Federal Government

Chapare coca growers cut ties with USAID after years of poorly-framed, ineffectual initiatives. Prepared by the Andean Information Network, June 27, 2008 On June 24, 2008 Chapare coca grower unions announced that they will no longer sign new aid agreements with USAID.[i] This announcement comes after two decades of poorly-focused policies, which did little to improve the lives of the majority of Chapare residents, especially during forced eradication. These development programs also provoked division and friction within the region by dividing communities and linking aid to controversial coca reduction. As a result, it is not surprising that Chapare coca growers made this decision; it is only surprising that they waited so long. Furthermore, the announcement is largely a symbolic gesture; USAID plans to shift the bulk of its already restricted Chapare activities to the La Paz Yungas in the coming year, and Chapare municipalities have found other funding partners. According to the 2008 INSCR, “Relatively more resources will be devoted to the Yungas, an under-developed coca growing region ….Assistance to the Chapare will continue to decline….” As a result, the number and scope of projects affected is minimal. It is interesting to note that there has been no rejection of cooperation with the U.S. Narcotics Affairs Section or the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in the Chapare. Coca grower representatives affirm the need for their presence, “because their policy is to fight drug trafficking, like ours, but now it’s on our terms.”[ii] Coordination on cooperative coca reduction and interdiction remain unaltered. It is crucial to look beyond the initial perception of an anti-American political stance to address the genuine popular discontent generated by these programs in order to properly re-evaluate the structure and impact of USAID initiatives. In an environment where the weight of US funding has diminished greatly, it makes sense to accept the Chapare farmers’ “no thank you,” and allow the region’s residents to determine who they would like to work with to improve the lives of their families. The long term frustration with USAID in the Chapare is real, but the threat of violence is highly unlikely. There is no apparent backlash against USAID workers. According to MAS congressman Asterio Romero, “We cordially request that they (USAID) leave; we won’t use force or take over their facilities, but we want them to go quickly.”[iii] While some cocaleros may have said some provocative things such as calling the Chapare a “USAID-free territory,”[iv] USAID has not been entirely expelled from the Chapare – the few ongoing projects will most likely continue until their designated end dates. Coca growers are simply moving toward other sources of aid and away from the conditions and failures of USAID projects. The cocaleros made their decision to reject USAID at the same time that several large projects have ended and new projects through the European Union funded Social Control and Integrated Development initiatives – which focus on working with local communities and do not impose coca eradication – were launched. A history of failure and friction During the past ten years, AIN, WOLA and other investigators have repeatedly highlighted the inherent flaws of USAID alternative development initiatives in the Chapare, especially during forced eradication. Key areas of concern included: - Externally-designed and imposed initiatives developed without significant consultation with Chapare farmers. - The great majority of funds dedicated to overhead, salaries of foreign consultants and other costs. “Eighty percent of these resources went to pay the salaries of the Alternative Development personnel; twenty percent went to production, and only six percent for the producers. We only got crumbs, and we are still poor.”[v] - From 1998-2003, farmers could only have access to USAID assistance after the complete eradication of their coca crop. As a result, families with no alternative income went hungry before agricultural initiatives kicked in, forcing them to replant coca. - USAID projects refused to work directly with coca growers unions, although these strong organizations could have helped facilitate the implementation of projects. Instead, they formed parallel ‘associations” and demanded that farmers leave unions to receive assistance. This practice generated divisions and conflict within Chapare communities. - Community promoters were asked to inform USAID contractors about their neighbors who continued to plant coca or spoke out against alternative development, further heightening tensions in the region. - Poorly-designed agricultural initiatives lack affordable transportation mechanisms and markets. Many farmers found that it was cheaper to let their products rot in the field than it was to take them to market. - The majority of these projects failed due to impracticality of transporting heavy produce without proper roads, the low-market price offered locally for fruit, and the inability for small-scale Bolivian producers to compete on international markets. - A USAID contracted lawyer filed narcoterrorism charges against over one hundred coca growers, the bulk of the Six Federations leadership, for attacks on alternative development installations. - USAID took over the bulk of the funding of FAO projects, like the Jatun Sacha forestry initiative, forcing the project to incorporate US conditioning on coca eradication. - Unlike the more cost effective European Union initiative, Praedac, the US refused until 2003 to work with coca grower municipalities in the Chapare. - USAID placed increasing emphasis on work with private enterprise in the Chapare, which failed to pass profits on to or fairly compensate their employees. A short-lived policy shift In late 2003, after the resignation of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, USAID decided to begin to work collaboratively with coca grower municipalities in the Chapare, in an effort to alleviate the high tensions around US programs in the region. Coca growers welcomed the change and actively participated – a significant shift in acceptance of USAID initiatives in the region. - Unfortunately, with the election of Evo Morales, USAID froze these joint initiatives for a year, wreaking havoc with municipal planning. In the interim, Chapare mayors sought out and obtained significant alternative funding from the EU, European governments and Venezuela, without any of the political strings and conditioning attached to US efforts. - Even though they had frozen funding, the US claimed that the lack of violence in the region was due to “a new, integrated alternative development approach in the Chapare [which] provides for participation by municipalities in GOB decisions on development, implementation and monitoring of programs. This has helped reduce coca-related conflict and strengthen local commitment to licit development.”[vi] Coca growers were understandably angered by this misleading statement. - When USAID initiatives resumed in the region, they were increasingly irrelevant. New requirements, such as renewed conditioning on coca reduction, although now on a global and not family level, and the obligation to sign an agreement certifying that recipient communities were “terrorist-free zones” exacerbated this situation. In addition, after the election of Morales, USAID began to block meetings of NGOs, such as AIN and WOLA, with its Chapare contractors. When asked, one high-ranking USAID official in Bolivia explained that, “It would be problematic to allow contractors to speak in the name of the US government,” and said that AIN could tour alternative development facilities escorted by USAID personnel. This lack of transparency is quite surprising, considering that in prior years, both organizations had always had free access to all USAID projects, even during the peak of violent conflicts. AIN attempted to find contact information for over twenty USAID contractors within Bolivian, could only identify nine, and when contacted, only one organization accepted a meeting. This lack of transparency around USAID initiatives is problematic and inexplicable, when nongovernmental investigation in the past had led to significant improvement in programs. With the history of failed alternative development, lack of transparency, and conditionality of coca eradication, it is hardly surprising that Chapare growers have rejected further ties to USAID funding. In a region where local unions and grassroots organizations were already highly politically mobilized, these programs served to undermine the history of community organizing. After living through the tensions and failures associated with USAID, Morales’ and his administration’s mistrust of USAID initiatives is hardly inexplicable. In light of repeated Morales administration accusations of USAID funding of the opposition’s political agendas, the proposed doubling of US assistance in the FY2009 Budget Request from economic development to “rule of law, good governance, electoral processes, consensus building, civil society and education,” has intensified these underlying tensions. Chapare growers are moving toward different funding sources such as the European Union and Venezuela, which come with far less strings attached and do not condition assistance on reducing the coca crop. The MAS administration, while critical of many US policies and frustrated with conditional aid, continues to work with and receive funding from the US, especially anti-narcotics programs. Voices from the Chapare tell the real story. The mayor of Villa Tunari said, “We don’t want USAID anymore, if they are going to cooperate, it would have to be without conditions like the European Union.”[vii] Time to re-evaluate US development initiatives Although it may be tempting to characterize Chapare coca growers as ungrateful “beneficiaries,” blindly tied to their leader’s anti-US political agenda, their rejection of USAID projects is an important example of negative impact of development policy tied to political agendas. It is important to note that more pragmatic, grounded U.S.-funded development efforts in Bolivia, such as the Interamerican Foundation projects, continue to be well-received in all departments, and by MAS and prefectural officials. Especially on the eve of a national election, the predictable rejection of USAID assistance by coca growers should serve as a wake-up call to US planners and policymakers. It is crucial to reassess the design, orientation and objectives of US-funded development effects to meaningfully involve the participants and eliminate political conditioning. Background reading on USAID Alternative Development in Bolivia Failures of alternative development: Linda Farthing’s “Rethinking Alternative Development” Political conditioning of USAID: Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl’s: “Conflicting Agenda’s: The Politics of Development Aid in Drug-Producing Areas” Linda Farthing and Kathryn Ledebur’s: “The Beat goes On: The US War on Coca” 2006 USAID funding freeze and its impact: Coletta Youngers and Kathryn Ledebur: “Update on Drug Policy Issues in Bolivia” Failures of USAID and potential benefits of EU projects: Kathryn Ledebur and Coletta A. Younger’s “Balancing Act: Bolivia’s Drug Control Advances and Challenges” -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [i] “Usaid deja el trópico y EEUU teme por la seguridad de su personal.” Los Tiempos, 26 June, 2008. [ii] Cocaleros piden la salida de otras agencias cooperantes.” La Razón 27 June 2008. [iii] Ibid. [iv] “Funcionarios de Usaid salen del Chapare,” La Rázon, 26 June 2008. [v] “Cocaleros piden la salida de otras agencias cooperantes.” La Razón 27 June 2008. [vi] The 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report is available at http://www.sta te.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2007/vol1/html/80855.htm [vii] “Funcionarios de Usaid salen del Chapare.”

[Courtesy of The Sentencing Project] Friends, At a time of growing national concern about unequal treatment within the justice system, the United States Sentencing Commission today lowered the Guideline sentences for offenses involving crack cocaine, likely impacting 3,500 federally sentenced defendants each year. Commission concerns about the excessive penalty structure for crack cocaine offenses prompted the change that on average will reduce defendants' sentences by 15 months. The Commission sets an advisory guideline range that federal judges use when sentencing defendants. Under the old range, average sentences for crack cocaine offenses were 121 months. Now the estimated average sentence will be 106 months. In May the Commission recommended statutory reforms and proposed to Congress the amendment to decrease the guideline offense level for crack cocaine offenses. The amendment went unchallenged by Congress and therefore takes effect today. According to Commission analysis, the modification would reduce the size of the federal prison population by 3,800 in 15 years. Such a reduction would result in savings of over $87 million, according to The Sentencing Project. This change, however, only addresses one aspect of the controversy surrounding crack cocaine sentencing. The Commission is currently considering whether to apply the amendment retroactively - a move that would make approximately 19,500 persons in prison eligible for a reduced sentence. The Commission will hear testimony on this issue at a Nov. 13 public hearing at which I will testify in favor of retroactivity. In a submission to the Commission, The Sentencing Project argues that "the Commission, courts, and commentators all have recognized the undue disparity caused by the Guidelines since their inception. Thus, defendants who were incarcerated when the problems with the crack Guidelines first became evident should also be granted an opportunity to pursue the benefit of this long overdue remedy." The new policy comes on the heels of oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in Kimbrough v. the United States. The high court is being asked to uphold the authority of federal judges to depart from the sentencing guidelines in crack cocaine cases when they disagree with sentencing policy. Furthermore, bipartisan reform legislation is pending in Congress and hearings addressing the statutory mandatory minimum sentences are expected this fall. Use the following links to read The Sentencing Project's letter to the Commission urging retroactivity, and learn more about the momentum to end the sentencing disparity at: www.sentencingproject.org/crackreform. Regards, Marc Mauer

[Courtesy of DEA] News Release FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE August 6, 2007 American Express Bank International Enters Into Deferred Prosecution Agreement And Forfeits $55 Million To Resolve Bank Secrecy Act Violations AUG 6 -- WASHINGTON ­ Miami-based American Express Bank International has entered into a deferred prosecution agreement on charges of failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program and will forfeit $55 million to the U.S. government, Assistant Attorney General Alice S. Fisher of the Criminal Division and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Administrator Karen Tandy announced today. A criminal information filed today at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami charges American Express Bank International with one count of failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program. American Express Bank International waived indictment, agreed to the filing of the information, and accepted and acknowledged responsibility for its behavior in a factual statement accompanying the information. The company will pay $55 million to the United States to settle forfeiture claims held by the government. In light of the bank¹s remedial actions to date and its willingness to acknowledge responsibility for its actions, the government will recommend the dismissal of the charge in 12 months, provided the bank fully implements significant anti-money laundering measures required by the agreement. ³Banks and other financial institutions must uphold their responsibility to safeguard financial markets from the illegal activities of international drug cartels and professional money launderers,² said Assistant Attorney General Alice S. Fisher of the Criminal Division. ³An effective anti-money laundering program is critical to law enforcement efforts to detect and cut off the flow of drug money. The Department of Justice will continue to work to stop financial institutions from knowingly disregarding their obligations to have these vital programs in place.² ³Today an established and respected financial institution learned a valuable lesson about its legal responsibilities. American Express and all legitimate banking organizations must take every step possible to avoid becoming entangled in the web of international drug money laundering,² said DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy. ³Today the message is loud and clear: due diligence-don't take money without it.² The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has also assessed a $25 million civil money penalty against the company for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve has assessed a $20 million civil money penalty. The $20 million Federal Reserve penalty and $15 million of FinCEN¹s $25 million penalty will be deemed satisfied by the payment of the $55 million forfeiture, resulting in total payments of $65 million by American Express Bank International under these settlements. Under the Bank Secrecy Act, banks are required to establish and maintain an anti-money laundering compliance program that, at a minimum, provides for: (a) internal policies, procedures and controls designed to guard against money laundering; (b) the coordination and monitoring of day-to-day compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act; (c) an ongoing employee training program; and (d) independent testing for compliance conducted by bank personnel or an outside party. Banks are also required to have comprehensive anti-money laundering programs that enable them to identify and report suspicious financial transactions to the U.S. Treasury Department¹s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. The case was prosecuted by Trial Attorneys John W. Sellers and Thomas Pinder of the Criminal Division¹s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, which is headed by Chief Richard Weber. This case was investigated by the Drug Enforcement Administration¹s Miami Field Division, Fort Lauderdale District Office.

For Immediate Release: July 19, 2007 Contact: Bill Piper at (202) 669-6430 or Tony Newman at (646) 335-5384 Sen. Hilary Rodham Clinton Vows to End Federal Raids on Medical Marijuana Patients Remarks Come on Eve of Vote in House of Representatives to Stop Bush Administration’s Heartless Raids During a presidential campaign stop in New Hampshire last Friday, Sen. Hilary Rodham Clinton pledged to end federal raids on medical marijuana patients. The pledge came in response to a question posed by Len Epstein, a volunteer for Granite Staters for Medical Marijuana (GSMM). After telling Clinton, "Twelve states allow medical marijuana, but the Bush administration continues to raid patients," she responded, "Yes, I know. It's terrible." Epstein then asked, "Would you stop the federal raids?" Clinton responded, "Yes, I will." Her remarks echo remarks she made in May in which she suggested the federal government was being “excessive” in its dealing with medical marijuana patients. Twelve states, (Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington) have adopted effective medical marijuana laws since 1996 - most of them by a vote of the people. Dozens of other states have adopted largely symbolic medical marijuana laws. The Drug Enforcement Administration, however, continues to arrest medical marijuana patients and their caregivers in those states. “Sen. Clinton has shown real leadership by pledging to stop federal medical marijuana raids,” said Bill Piper, director of national affairs for the Drug Policy Alliance. “I hope her colleagues in the House follow her lead and vote to prohibit the Justice Department from arresting medical marijuana patients and their caregivers in those states where marijuana is legal for medical use.” Next week, the House of Representatives will vote on an amendment that would prohibit the Justice Department from undermining state medical marijuana laws. Last year, 163 representatives (75 percent of Democrats; 18 percent of Republicans) voted for a similar amendment. In addition to Clinton's remarks, every other Democratic presidential candidate has vowed to end federal medical marijuana raids - except for Sen. Barak Obama who indicated in June that the raids shouldn't be a priority for the Justice Department, but stopped short of pledging to end the raids completely if elected president. Earlier this year Gov. Bill Richardson became the first U.S. presidential candidate in history to sign legislation legalizing marijuana for medical use. On the Republican side, only Rep. Ron Paul, Rep. Tom Tancredo, and former Gov. Tommy Thompson have indicated they would end the federal medical marijuana raids.

For Immediate Release: May 17, 2007 Contact: Jasmine L. Tyler at 202-294-8292 US Sentencing Commission urges Congress to Reduce Crack/Powder Cocaine Sentencing Disparity Experts to Brief Congress on Current Cocaine Policy and the Need for Reform Washington, DC—Criminal justice experts will hold briefings on the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity for Congressional staffers on Monday, May 21. They will discuss the United States Sentencing Commission’s (USSC) May 2007 Guideline Amendment and Report to Congress. Joining the panel will be Hilary Shelton from the NAACP, Pat Nolan from Prison Fellowship, and Lisa Rich from the USSC. These briefings will be moderated by Jessalyn McCurdy of the ACLU and Marc Mauer of The Sentencing Project. The briefing is co-sponsored by the Drug Policy Alliance. ********************************************************************* WHAT: Reforming Crack and Powder Cocaine Sentencing Briefing for Congressional staffers WHO: Members of Congress and staff, media, policy advocates, stakeholders, treatment providers, faith leaders When: Monday, May 21 House Briefing: 9 a.m. - B340 Rayburn House Office Building Senate Briefing: 2 p.m. - 485 Russell Senate Office Building ********************************************************************* Twenty years ago when the crack cocaine sentencing laws were first passed by Congress, the United States faced a panic about the alleged “crack epidemic” and operated under the impression that crack had inherent properties that made it infinitely more dangerous than powder cocaine. These reports, which served as the basis for the huge disparity, have since been found to be fundamentally flawed, rendering the 100-to-1 disparity arbitrary and capricious. Further, these laws have proven ineffective in reducing drug use or distribution and have instead exacerbated racial disparity and injustices in our criminal justice system. The USSC has taken the lead on eliminating the crack/powder sentencing disparity by amending the federal sentencing guidelines to lessen the punishment range for crack cocaine cases by approximately one to two years. The Commission also urged Congress to reform federal mandatory minimum sentences to reduce the statutory disparity. Currently, there is growing bipartisan support for reforming the crack/powder disparity. There are two house bills pending and a similar one before the Senate. # # #

Who: Senator Larry Campbell, Ethan Nadelmann, Line Beauchance, Eugene Oscapella Where: Charles Lynch Press Theatre, Parliament Hill, Ottawa When: Thursday, February 22, 2007 at 1:30 p.m. Contact: Eugene Oscapella, 613-282-1864 or Ethan Nadelmann, 212-613-8020

For Immediate Release: Wednesday, February 21, 2007 Contact: Paco Fabian or Kate Geller, 202-822-5200 Patients File Lawsuit Challenging Federal Government On Medical Cannabis, Demand FDA Correct Misinformation

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: December 21, 2006 CONTACT: Anna Cederstav, AIDA (510) 550-6700 [email protected] Astrid Puentes, AIDA (5255) 52120141 [email protected] PLAN COLOMBIA AERIAL HERBICIDE SPRAYING NOT PROVEN SAFE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: Ecuador's concerns about border sprayings are well founded says international environmental NGO